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Abstract. We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the preferences of the union and
the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. The contribution of the
paper is twofold. First, we consider a model in which the union must choose between strike and
holdout in case of disagreement. We show that there exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in
the model where the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement.
Furthermore, we analyze a wage bargaining in which the firm is allowed to engage in lockouts. We
consider a game in which only lockouts are feasible, i.e., strikes are not allowed. We prove that
under certain assumptions there is a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game and it leads to an
immediate agreement which yields the union a wage contract smaller than the status quo contract.
Under this equilibrium the firm always locks out the union after its own offer is rejected and holds
out after rejecting an offer of the union.
JEL Classification: J52, C78
Keywords: union - firm bargaining, varying discount rates, subgame perfect equilibrium,
inefficient equilibria, strike, lockouts
Corresponding author: Agnieszka Rusinowska
1 Introduction
In the union-firm wage bargaining originally introduced in Fernandez and Glazer (1991),
Haller and Holden (1990) and further analyzed, e.g., in Holden (1994), Bolt (1995), Houba
and Wen (2008), the union and the firm bargain sequentially over a new wage contract
and in case of disagreement the union must choose between strike and holdout. While in
this literature the parties are assumed to have constant discount rates, in Ozkardas and
Rusinowska (2014a,b) we consider a generalized wage bargaining in which the preferences
of both parties are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. However,
only efficient equilibria have been considered in this generalized framework so far. More
precisely, in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a) we determine subgame perfect equilibria
for several cases when the strike decision of the union is exogenous and also consider the
general model with no assumption on the commitment to strike. In Ozkardas and Rusi-
nowska (2014b) the analysis of the generalized wage bargaining is continued: we derive
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the exact bounds of the equilibrium payoffs and characterize the equilibrium strategy
profiles that support these extreme payoffs.
Apart from the analysis of efficient equilibria in the wage bargaining with constant
discount rates, Fernandez and Glazer (1991) also present a result on inefficient equilibria
and additionally mention an extension of the model in which the firm is allowed to lock
out the union. To the best of our knowledge these issues have not been considered so far
for the model with discount rates varying in time.
The aim of the present paper is to study inefficient equilibria and lockouts in the
generalized wage bargaining. More precisely, the contribution of the paper is twofold. Our
first result concerns a model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout
in case of disagreement. We show that there exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria
in the model where the union strikes for uninterrupted T periods prior to reaching a final
agreement. Next, we consider a model in which the firm is allowed to engage in lockouts.
We examine a game in which only lockouts by the firm are feasible, i.e., the union is not
allowed to strike. We prove that under certain assumptions there is a subgame perfect
equilibrium with an immediate agreement which yields the union a wage contract smaller
than the status quo contract. Under this equilibrium the firm always locks out the union
after its own offer is rejected and holds out after rejecting an offer of the union.
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. In Section 2, first we briefly
describe the wage bargaining between the union and the firm with preferences expressed
by discount rates varying in time, in which the union must choose between strike and
holdout in case of disagreement. Next we prove the result on inefficient equilibria in the
model. Section 3 concerns the generalized wage bargaining in which the firm is allowed
to engage in lockouts. Some concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.
2 Inefficient equilibria in the generalized model with strikes
We consider the following wage bargaining procedure between the union and the firm,
originally introduced in Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990).
There is a status quo contract w0 ∈ (0, 1] that specifies the wage that a worker is entitled
to per day of work. This wage contract needs to be renegotiated by the union and the firm
who bargain sequentially in discrete time and a potentially infinite horizon. The union
proposes a certain contract W 0 ∈ [0, 1] in period 0 and if the firm accepts it, then the
agreement is reached and the payoffs are (W 0, 1 −W 0), i.e., the union gets W0 and the
firm (1 −W0). If the firm rejects the offer, then the union can either go on strike and
then both parties obtain (0, 0) in the current period or hold out which gives the payoffs
(w0, 1−w0). Independently of the strike-holdout decision of the union, after rejecting the
offer it is the firm’s turn to make a new offer Z1 in period 1, etc. This alternating-offers
procedure continues until an agreement is reached. If an offer is rejected by a party, then
the union decides whether or not to strike in that period and the rejecting party makes its
offer in the next period. The result of the wage bargaining is either a pair (W,T ), where
W is the wage contract agreed upon and T ∈ N is the number of proposals rejected in
the bargaining, or a disagreement denoted by (0,∞) and meaning the situation in which
the parties never reach an agreement.
Fernandez and Glazer (1991) analyze the model in which preferences of the union and
the firm are expressed by constant discount rates δu and δf , respectively, and Haller and
2
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Holden (1990) even assume that both parties have the same discount rate δ. Contrary to
this literature and similarly to our previous work (Ozkardas and Rusinowska, 2014a,b), we
analyze the wage bargaining in which preferences of the union and the firm are described
by sequences (δu,t)t∈N and (δf,t)t∈N of discount factors (rates) varying in time, where δu,t
is the discount factor of the union and δf,t is that of the firm in period t ∈ N, and
δu,0 = δf,0 = 1, 0 < δi,t < 1 for t ≥ 1. Let for each t ∈ N
δu(t) :=
t∏
k=0
δu,k, δf (t) :=
t∏
k=0
δf,k (1)
and for 0 < t′ ≤ t
δu(t
′, t) :=
δu(t)
δu(t′ − 1)
=
t∏
k=t′
δu,k, δf (t
′, t) :=
δf (t)
δf (t′ − 1)
=
t∏
k=t′
δf,k (2)
The utility of the result (W,T ) for the union is equal to
U(W,T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δu(t)ut (3)
where ut = W for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then for each 0 ≤ t < T
ut = 0 if there is a strike in period t ∈ N
ut = w0 if there is no strike in period t.
The utility of the result (W,T ) for the firm is equal to
V (W,T ) =
∞∑
t=0
δf (t)vt (4)
where vt = 1−W for each t ≥ T , and if T > 0 then for each 0 ≤ t < T
vt = 0 if there is a strike in period t
vt = 1− w0 if there is no strike in period t.
The utility of the disagreement is equal to
U(0,∞) = V (0,∞) = 0 (5)
We assume that the infinite series in (3) and (4) are convergent.
By ∆u(t) and ∆f (t) we denote the generalized discount factors of the union and the
firm in period t, respectively. They are defined as follow, for every t ∈ N+:
∆u(t) :=
∑
∞
k=t δu(t, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δu(t, k)
, ∆f (t) :=
∑
∞
k=t δf (t, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=t δf (t, k)
(6)
The generalized discount factors take into account the sequences of discount rates varying
in time and the fact that the utilities are defined by the discounted streams of payoffs.
3
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Note that for the special case of constant discount rates, i.e., if δu,t = δu and δf,t = δf for
every t ∈ N+, ∆u(t) = δu and ∆f (t) = δf .
In Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a,b) we consider only efficient equilibria in the
generalized wage bargaining where the agreement is reached immediately in period 0. Now
we will prove the result concerning inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in this model
where the union strikes for uninterrupted T periods prior to reaching a final agreement.
Theorem 1 Consider the generalized wage bargaining model with preferences of the
union and the firm described by the sequences of discount factors (δi,t)t∈N , where δi,0 = 1,
0 < δi,t < 1 for t ≥ 1, i = u, f . If wˆ ∈ [0, 1] and T ≥ 1 are such that
w0 ≤ wˆ
∑
∞
k=T δu(1, k)
1 +
∑
∞
k=1 δu(1, k)
(7)
and for each τ ∈ N such that 2τ + 1 < T
(1− wˆ)
∞∑
k=T
δf (1, k) ≥
(
1− Z
2τ+1
) ∞∑
k=2τ+1
δf (1, k) (8)
where Z
2τ+1
denotes the firm’s offer in period 2τ + 1 given by:
Z
2τ+1
= W
2τ+2
∆u(2τ + 2) (9)
W
2τ
= 1−∆f (2τ + 1) +
∞∑
m=τ
(1−∆f (2m+ 3))
m∏
j=τ
∆u(2j + 2)∆f (2j + 1) (10)
then there is a subgame perfect equilibrium with a strike of T periods (from period 0 till
T − 1) followed by an agreement wˆ reached in period T .
Proof: Let wˆ and T be such that (7) and (8) are satisfied. Let W
2t
and Z
2t+1
denote
the offers of the union and the firm, respectively, defined in formulas (10) and (9). In
Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a) it is proven that these are the SPE offers under the
always-strike decision. Consider the following pair of strategies:
Strategy of the union:
(i) In every period t < T , where neither the union nor the firm has deviated before:
- if t is even then make an unacceptable offer (that the firm rejects, e.g., 1 for the
union)
- if t is odd then accept y if and only if y ≥ Z
t
- strike if there is a disagreement
(ii) In period T , where neither the union nor the firm has deviated before:
- if T is even then propose wˆ
- if T is odd then accept y if and only if y ≥ wˆ
- strike if there is a disagreement
(iii) In every period t > T , where neither the union nor the firm has deviated before:
- if t is even then propose W
t
- if t is odd then accept y if and only if y ≥ Z
t
4
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- strike if there is a disagreement
(iv) If in period t ≤ T the union deviates, then play the minimum wage strategy thereafter
(v) If in period t ≤ T the firm deviates, then play the always strike strategy thereafter
(vi) If in period t > T any party deviates, then play the minimum wage strategy thereafter.
Strategy of the firm:
(i) In every period t < T , where neither the union nor the firm has deviated before:
- if t is odd then make an unacceptable offer (that the union rejects, e.g., w0 for the
union)
- if t is even then accept x if and only if x ≤ w0
(ii) In period T , where neither the union nor the firm has deviated before:
- if T is odd then propose wˆ
- if T is even then accept x if and only if x ≤ wˆ
(iii) In every period t > T , where neither the union nor the firm has deviated before:
- if t is odd then propose Z
t
- if t is even then accept x if and only if x ≤ W
t
(iv) If in period t ≤ T the union deviates, then play the minimum wage strategy thereafter
(v) If in period t ≤ T the firm deviates, then play the always strike strategy thereafter
(vi) If in period t > T any party deviates, then play the minimum wage strategy thereafter.
One can show that this pair of strategies is the SPE. In every subgame such that a
party has deviated before, this pair of strategies is the Nash equilibrium, since the mini-
mum wage strategies, the always strike strategies, as well as the always strike strategies
with the switch to the minimum wage strategies in case of a deviation, form the Nash
equilibria; for the proofs, see Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a).
Also note that by virtue of (7), the union prefers to strike till period T − 1 instead
of reaching an earlier agreement. More precisely, from condition (7) the union prefers
to strike till period T − 1 instead of reaching an agreement immediately. Note that (7)
implies the following condition, for every 0 < T ′ < T
w0
∞∑
k=T ′
δu(1, k) ≤ wˆ
∞∑
k=T
δu(1, k) (11)
To see that, note that
wˆ
∞∑
k=T
δu(1, k) ≥ w0
(
1 +
∞∑
k=1
δu(1, k)
)
= w0
(
1 +
T ′−1∑
k=1
δu(1, k) +
∞∑
k=T ′
δu(1, k)
)
>
> w0
∞∑
k=T ′
δu(1, k)
By virtue of (11), the union prefers to strike till period T−1 instead of reaching an earlier
agreement in period T ′.
Any deviation of the union prior to period T would not be better to the union, because
if the union deviates, e.g., by trying to reach an earlier agreement that the firm would
prefer than wˆ in period T , then the parties play thereafter the minimum wage strategies
that give w0 to the union.
5
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By virtue of (8), also the firm would not be better off by deviating and trying to reach
an earlier agreement, because if the firm makes an offer in any period 2τ + 1 < T that
the union would prefer, then the parties play the always strike strategies thereafter. 
Fernandez and Glazer (1991) prove (Theorem 2) that in the wage bargaining1 with
constant discount rates δu and δf , if wˆ is such that(
1− δ1−Tf
)
F + δ1−Tf z ≥ wˆ ≥ δ
−T
u w0 (12)
where w =
(1−δf )F
1−δuδf
and z =
δu(1−δf )F
1−δuδf
are the solutions to Rubinstein’s original bargaining
game2 (Rubinstein, 1982), then there is a subgame perfect equilibrium with a strike of T
periods followed by an agreement of wˆ. Note that if we apply our Theorem 1 to the case
of constant discount rates, δu,t = δu and δf,t = δf for every t ∈ N+, and F = 1, then we
recover the result of Fernandez and Glazer (1991).
3 The generalized wage bargaining with lockouts
In the generalized wage bargaining considered in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a,b),
only the union is allowed to engage in actions different from making offers and accept-
ing/rejecting such as going on strike or holding out. Let us consider a model in which the
firm is allowed to engage in lockouts and holdout. For simplicity and without affecting
qualitatively our results, we assume that if the firm locks out the union, then the parties
get (0, 0), and in case of holdout – as usual – they get (w0, 1− w0). We examine a game
in which only lockouts by the firm are feasible, i.e., the union is not allowed to strike. By
W
2t
LAR and Z
2t+1
LAR we denote the SPE offers in this game. We have the following result.
Theorem 2 Consider the generalized wage bargaining model with lockouts and without
strikes, in which preferences of the union and the firm are described by the sequences of
discount factors (δi,t)t∈N , where δi,0 = 1, 0 < δi,t < 1 for t ≥ 1, i = u, f . If
1− w0 ≤
(
1−W
2t+2
LAR
)
∆f (2t+ 2) for every t ∈ N (13)
and the following condition is satisfied
∆f (2t+ 1) ≤ ∆u(2t+ 1) for each t ∈ N (14)
then there exists a SPE in which the agreement of W
0
LAR is reached in period 0, where
for each t ∈ N
W
2t
LAR = w0
(
1−∆f (2t+ 1) +
∞∑
m=t
(1−∆f (2m+ 3))
m∏
j=t
∆u(2j + 2)∆f (2j + 1)
)
(15)
Z
2t+1
LAR = W
2t+2
LAR∆u(2t+ 2) (16)
This SPE is supported by the following ‘generalized alternating lockout strategies’:
1 In Fernandez and Glazer (1991) the wage offers are made over discrete time periods t ∈ {1, 2, ...} with the
union proposing in odd-numbered periods and the firm proposing in even-numbered periods. In our setup this
is also the union that starts the bargaining but in period 0, i.e., it makes its offers in even-numbered periods.
2 Without loss of generality we assume that F = 1.
6
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– In period 2t the union proposes W
2t
LAR, in period 2t + 1 it accepts an offer y if and
only if y ≥ Z
2t+1
LAR.
– In period 2t+ 1 the firm proposes Z
2t+1
LAR, in period 2t it accepts an offer x if and only
if x ≤ W
2t
LAR, it holds out after rejecting an offer of the union in period 2t and locks
out after rejection of its own proposals in period 2t+ 1.
– If, however, at some point, the firm deviates from the above rule, then both parties
play thereafter according to the ‘minimum-wage strategies’:
• The union offers w0 for each t ∈ N and accepts y if and only if y ≥ w0.
• The firm offers w0 for each t ∈ N and accepts x if and only if x ≤ w0, and never
locks out the union.
Proof: In the proof we will write simply W
2t
and Z
2t+1
instead of W
2t
LAR and Z
2t+1
LAR. We
need to solve the following system, for each t ∈ N:
1−W
2t
= (1− w0) (1−∆f (2t+ 1)) +
(
1− Z
2t+1
)
∆f (2t+ 1)
and
Z
2t+1
= W
2t+2
∆u (2t+ 2)
which is equivalent, for each t ∈ N, to
W
2t
− Z
2t+1
∆f (2t+ 1) = w0 (1−∆f (2t+ 1)) and Z
2t+1
−W
2t+2
∆u (2t+ 2) = 0 (17)
and forms a regular triangular system AX = Y , with A = [aij]i,j∈N+ , X =
[
(xi)i∈N+
]T
,
Y =
[
(yi)i∈N+
]T
, where for each t, j ≥ 1
at,t = 1, at,j = 0 for j < t or j > t+ 1 (18)
and for each t ∈ N
a2t+1,2t+2 = −∆f (2t+ 1) , a2t+2,2t+3 = −∆u (2t+ 2) (19)
x2t+1 = W
2t
, x2t+2 = Z
2t+1
, y2t+1 = w0 (1−∆f (2t+ 1)) , y2t+2 = 0 (20)
Since we have the same A as in the always strike decision (see Ozkardas and Rusinowska
(2014a)), its (unique) inverse matrix B is the same. By applying X = BY we get W
2t
as
in Theorem 2.
The ‘generalized alternating lockout strategies’ form a SPE. Using the similar method
to the one applied in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2014a), one can easily show that no
deviation would be profitable for the deviating party.
In particular, the firm gets (1 − w0)
(
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δf (2t+ 2, k)
)
when deviating from
its lockouts decision in period 2t + 1, and
(
1−W
2t+2
)∑
∞
k=2t+2 δf (2t + 2, k) when not
deviating. Hence, by virtue of condition (13), the firm does not want to deviate. Also
1 − w0 ≤
(
1−W
2t+2
)
∆f (2t + 2) ≤ 1 − W
2t+2
and therefore we get W
2t+2
≤ w0
and also Z
2t+1
= W
2t+2
∆u (2t+ 2) < w0. Furthermore, W
2t
= Z
2t+1
∆f (2t+ 1) +
w0 (1−∆f (2t+ 1)) > Z
2t+1
.
7
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If the union deviates and offers some x > W
2t
in period 2t, then it gets w0 +
Z
2t+1∑∞
k=2t+1 δu(2t+ 1, k). But from (14) and (17) we have:
W
2t
= Z
2t+1
∆f (2t+ 1) + w0 (1−∆f (2t+ 1)) = w0 −∆f (2t+ 1)
(
w0 − Z
2t+1
)
≥ w0 −
∆u (2t+ 1)
(
w0 − Z
2t+1
)
= w0(1 − ∆u (2t+ 1)) + Z
2t+1
∆u (2t+ 1) and therefore w0 +
Z
2t+1∑∞
k=2t+1 δu(2t+ 1, k) ≤ W
2t
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δu(2t+ 1, k)). Hence, the deviation would
not be profitable for the union.
If the union deviates and offers some x < W
2t
in period 2t, then it gets x(1 +∑
∞
k=2t+1 δu(2t + 1, k)) < W
2t
(1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+1 δu(2t + 1, k)), so the union would be worse
off by this deviation.
If the union deviates in period 2t+1 and accepts an offer that gives it less than Z
2t+1
or rejects an offer that gives it at least Z
2t+1
, then from the second equation of (17), the
union will not be better off.
If the firm deviates in period 2t + 1 when making an offer, then it gets at most
(1−w0)
(
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δf (2t+ 2, k)
)
<
(
1− Z
2t+1
) (
1 +
∑
∞
k=2t+2 δf (2t+ 2, k)
)
as Z
2t+1
<
w0, so the firm would not be better off by any deviation.
If the firm deviates in period 2t when replying to an offer, i.e., it accepts an offer that
gives it less than 1−W
2t
or rejects an offer that gives it at least 1−W
2t
, then from the
first equation of (17), the firm will not be better off. 
Remark 1 Note that for every t ∈ N, W
2t
LAR = w0W
2t
AS < w0 and also Z
2t+1
LAR =
W
2t+2
LAR∆u(2t+2) < w0, whereW
2t
AS is the SPE offer made by the union in period 2t under
the always strike decision. Hence, under the SPE the union gets a wage contract smaller
than the status quo contract w0. For constant discount rates, we get W
2t
LAR =
w0(1−δf )
1−δf δu
.
4 Conclusion
There are several issues that could be examined in the follow-up research on the gener-
alized wage bargaining. First of all, we could examine a game in which both strikes and
lockouts are allowed. Our conjecture is that it is possible to generate subgame perfect
equilibria in this game in which strikes alternate with lockouts before a final agreement
is reached. Moreover, while in this paper we considered the model in which the firm was
allowed to engage in lockouts, other extensions could also be analyzed, like the model
where the union has an option of go-slow. Furthermore, it would be of importance to
apply the generalized wage bargaining to model real-life situations. The first attempt is
presented in Ozkardas and Rusinowska (2013), where we propose a modest application
of the model with discount factors varying in time to price negotiations. We intend to
continue this line of research and to investigate a more sophisticated model of pharma-
ceutical product price determination. In the model, a monopolistic firm that produces a
patented pharmaceutical product and a health authority, i.e., government, negotiate the
price of the the brand-name prescription drug.
8
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